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“Why did they do that?” is one of the most common questions that political 
scientists seek to answer.  The idea of a reason behind an action is an important part of the 
debate surrounding causation in the social sciences and in International Relations (IR).1  
The word “cause” originally meant a reason for an action, coming from the Latin word 
causa meaning “purpose” or “reason” (Martin 2011: 30).  In practice most explanations of 
behavior in political science rely, whether implicitly or explicitly, on some attribution of 
motive, intention, or some reason for action to actors.2  Explanations that do not give a 
reason why the actors involved did the action that we are trying to explain feel 
unsatisfying.  However, there is a tension involved when we try to justify how we know 
what the reasons of actors are.  We cannot see or perceive other people’s reasons for action 
the same way that we see our own;  we cannot introspect the reasons for action of other 
actors.  This presents us with a methodological problem that, while well-known, has no 
systematic treatment in the IR literature. 3   
Existing reactions to this methodological problem, the fundamental problem of 
                                                 
1  Not all claims of social science causation involve attributing reasons for action, as I show below.  
2 Most of the interest in IR is in attributing reasons to historical actors on the basis of documentary 
evidence, so I focus on that situation in this paper.  I also deal with reasons for action of individual 
people, rather than corporate actors.  In practice, discussion in IR often treats states as individual actors 
but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.   
3  For example, in a canonical methods text, King, Keohane, and Verba mention this problem but other than 
recommending specifying observable implications do not provide detailed guidance on how to address it 
(1994: 110).   
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reason attribution, has had several negative effects on the current IR literature that this 
paper addresses.  First, blanket skepticism about reasons, or the idea that we can never 
really know why people did what they did, is too extreme a reaction to the fact that 
evidence is imperfect.4  Such excessive skepticism comes from across the theoretical 
spectrum, from rationalism (Frieden 1999) to constructivism (Krebs and Jackson 2007).  
At worst, this skepticism can lead to denying we can ever know actors’ true reasons and at 
the same time relying on reasons as a core part of your theoretical apparatus.  This 
combination is exemplified by one version of the strategic choice approach to international 
relations (Frieden 1999) which holds that preferences and beliefs are essential to 
understanding but that scholars should not try to observe them.  Another problem is that 
skepticism about reasons may provoke unnecessarily unambitious theorizing via trying to 
avoid relying upon reasons. 
A second problem is a lack of general and consistent rules for evaluating competing 
reason attributions.  Despite the centrality of this problem to explanation, and the fact that 
multifarious insights on ways to approach this problem are scattered around the current 
literature, there is no clear specification of the types of claims that political scientists and 
IR scholars want to make about reasons.  Without a clear idea that there are multiple 
                                                 
4 That we can never really know for certain is true of all empirical claims about anything and is not unique 
to reason attribution.   
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different enterprises that we can be engaged in, conflation of types of knowledge claims 
can lead to criticisms that do not actually apply, erroneously undermining reason 
attribution.  This can lead to uneven and unconvincing analyses as well as fueling the 
belief that evidence of reasons is uniquely problematic.  Clear separation between these 
types of knowledge claims could facilitate appropriate evaluation of the claims that 
scholars actually make.   
Third, the misidentification of the contribution of purely theoretical explorations of 
reasons both undervalues theoretical work without an empirical component and oversells 
the empirical validity of, for example, formal modeling.   
In this paper, I provide a unifying framework that delineates different types of 
knowledge claims regarding reason attribution.  The paper articulates the fundamental 
problem of reason attribution and three possible methodological responses; 1) assume a 
possible reason and explain behavior in terms of that reason; 2) avoid the direct attribution 
of reason to individuals and locate explanatory leverage at an analytical level beyond the 
individual actor reason for action; and 3) use empirical evidence to adjudicate between 
possible reasons.  I show that how scholars react to the fundamental problem has 
constraining effects on the sort of knowledge claims that they can consistently make.  I 
argue that assuming or avoiding reasons because of excessive skepticism about empirical 
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evidence of reasons means losing a valuable part of our understanding of the causes of 
action.   
Existing mainstream methodological advice on reason attribution is largely limited 
to exhortations to use private documents rather than public statements, or occasionally to 
pay attention to the context of a speech-act.  However, the private documents gambit is not 
a panacea and may even be the opposite of good practice, depending on the type of 
knowledge claim.  In addition, consideration of context is a largely ad hoc maneuver, often 
only specifiable in particular cases, and without any guidance on how to evaluate 
alternative claims regarding the role of context.  This paper specifies the knowledge claims 
for which private documents are potentially preferable and argues, contrary to existing 
claims, that private settings do not systematically favor the true revelation of reasons.  The 
paper also proposes a general principle, consilience, that allows evaluation of empirical 
claims of reason attribution that subsumes several existing methodological considerations, 
organizes them, and gives a consistent means of choosing between alternative reason 
attributions.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  First I address the definition of reasons for action 
and introduce the use of reasons in causal explanation.  Then I lay out the fundamental 
problem of reason attribution.  The paper then considers and critiques two potential 
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responses to this problem; assuming reasons while still using them in your causal claims, 
and avoiding using reasons in causal claims.  Finally, I address the use of empirical 
evidence in reason attribution, considering a variety of issues.  
Reasons For Action 
One type of explanation in social science involves the attribution of a reason to an 
actor.  The actor performed an action because of the reason for that action.  Davidson 
(1963) makes the argument that the cause of an action can be described as the agent's 
reason for doing what she did.  This he calls the primary reason for the action.  A primary 
reason is made up of a 'pro-attitude', i.e. what it was about the type of action that appealed 
to the agent, and a belief that the action was of that type.  When we explain an action by 
providing the primary reason, we 'rationalize' the action, i.e. make it understandable.5  
Reasons need not be rational. For example, Lebow contends that “most, if not all, foreign-
policy behavior can be reduced to three fundamental motives: fear, interest, and honor.” 
(2010: 14).  Taylor similarly prioritizes understanding the reason an agent has for action:   
Now insofar as we are talking about behavior as action, hence in terms of 
meaning, the category of sense or coherence must apply to it.  This is not to say that 
all behavior must “make sense”, if we mean by this be rational, avoid contradiction, 
                                                 
5  Davidson’s position has attained quasi-consensus status in philosophy, although there is still contestation 
over philosophical issues, such as Davidson’s anomalous monism, whether mental causation is 
compatible with free will, whether causation is a single thing or an umbrella term collecting multiple 
types of relations, and whether types of mental states are identical with types of physical states (see 
D’Oro and Sandis 2013).   
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confusion of purpose, and the like.  Plainly a great deal of our action falls short of 
this goal.  But in another sense, even contradictory, irrational action is “made sense 
of,” when we understand why it was engaged in.  We make sense of action when 
there is a coherence between the actions of the agent and the meaning of his 
situation for him. We find his action puzzling until we find such a coherence.  It 
may not be bad to repeat that this coherence in no way implies that the action is 
rational: the meaning of a situation for an agent may be full of confusion and 
contradiction; but the adequate depiction of this contradiction makes sense of it. 
(Taylor 1971: 13-14).   
Making an action comprehensible, or “make sense”, involves redescribing the 
reason for the action in a way that intuitively makes sense to the observer.  For example, I 
can explain Jim's going to the store by saying that Jim was thirsty and wanted to buy a 
drink.  This makes the action comprehensible.  If instead I said that Jim went to the store 
because he wanted to see what the moon was like, I have not made the action 
comprehensible.6 
In this paper, the term ‘reason for action’ or ‘reason’ is used to refer to intentional 
mental states, and their components.7  There are a variety of terms that are sometimes used 
interchangeably in IR to refer to the contents of people’s minds before and during action.  
One common distinction is between preferences (or interests or desires or goals) and 
                                                 
6 This account of comprehensibility is merely illustrative of the central point.  There are other issues 
involved in comprehensibility such as the requirement of an intersubjectively shared meaning of terms, 
and the background knowledge necessary for such a shared meaning.  These issues are not the focus of 
this paper.   
7  That is, intentional in the sense of intending to do something, not Intentional in the sense of representing 
or directedness.  An example of a non-intentional mental state might be aimless day dreaming.   
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beliefs, which is similar to Davidson’s distinction between pro-attitudes and beliefs.8  
Other terms used include motivation and intention.  To say that an actor is motivated to do 
something incorporates the idea that the action is goal-directed, but it is possible to have a 
motive but not act upon it.9  Bratman makes the case that desires and beliefs are 
insufficient for action and that intentions are also required.  Intentions are “distinct 
psychological elements” (1981: 263) that essentially involve the formation of plans of 
action connecting desires and beliefs together in specific ways.  In IR, Rosato argues that 
state intentions are analogous to ‘strategies’ in game-theoretic terminology (2014: 53), 
although without the technical baggage.  In order to encompass this variety of mental 
states, I use the broad term ‘reason for action’.   
For ease of expression, in this paper I treat the reason for an action as a single 
entity.  However, multiple reasons are not only possible but plausibly endemic (Jansz 1996: 
480).  Reasons can be multiple in two ways; nested and overlapping.  Nested reasons are 
reasons at different levels of abstraction where each more concrete reason is an instance of 
a more abstract reason.  Baldwin illustrates this idea while discussing the reasons for the 
action of enacting a tariff on autos, with six levels of abstraction:  
                                                 
8 Davidson lists, “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic 
principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values” as examples 
of pro-attitudes (1963: 686).   
9  In ordinary language the word motive is often used to refer to an ulterior motive, i.e. one different from 
the one that is apparently driving someone’s behavior (as Berard notes [1998: 196-8]). 
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1. Getting Japan to export fewer cars to the United States, which is in turn a means 
to 
2. Supporting the price of domestically made autos, which is in turn a means to 
3. Ensuring the survival of the domestic automobile industry, which is in turn a 
means to 
4. Promoting the US “national interest”, which is in turn a means to 
5. Serving God's will by saving the world from the scourge of atheistic 
communism, which is in turn a means to 
6. Ensuring peace for one's soul in the hereafter.  (1985: 48)10 
Overlapping reasons are reasons whose object is the same.  For example, invading 
another country might be attractive because you think it demonstrates your capability and 
resolve, satisfies domestic desire for action, and increases the resources you have direct 
access to.11     
There are challenges to the use of reasons in explanation.  Apart from the 
methodological challenges discussed in this paper, some objections reject the causal role of 
motives.  A systematic evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper but I mention several 
such arguments here.  One is that conscious motives do not cause behavior because they do 
not really exist, another that subconscious psychological processes do so instead.12  
                                                 
10  A methodological problem nested reasons pose is that the theory choice at issue might be specified at a 
lower level of abstraction than the evidence.  The evidence might then not be able to choose between 
alternatives.   
11  One challenge for reason attribution is that the actual reason may be one, two, or all of these together, in 
that the action would not have been performed unless multiple reasons all pointed in the same direction.  
This problem can be mitigated by treating the set of overlapping reasons as a single-reason complex. 
12  E.g. Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006) on the idea that preferences are constructed in the process of 
elicitation, and Butler (1990) on the idea that performing certain actions constructs a sense of 
psychological interiority or subjectivity, which is fictional.   
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Another objection is that mental states of individuals add nothing to explanation because 
the meaning of action is determined intersubjectively and not by an isolated individual.  
The thrust behind this argument is that what an action is or counts as, i.e. the meaning of 
an action, is often not simply dependent upon the intentions of the actor.  For example, I 
can insult you without intending to do so.  Explaining what happened in this situation 
would involve reference to wider social structures and rules, like what counts as an insult 
in the society, what the appropriate response to an insult is, and so on.  Knowing my 
mental state immediately prior to my action does not, in and of itself, determine the 
description of the action as an insult, nor does it fully explain why this physical action or 
speech act can provoke such an extreme response.13  However, this objection fails to 
appreciate that explaining why someone did what they did is more fine-grained than 
merely accurately describing the action.14   
Another variety of reason skepticism resorts to the idea that it is irrelevant whether 
we make correct reason attributions, as long as our predictions about behavior are correct.  
This is known as the “as if” approach (Friedman 1953).  However, quite apart from the fact 
                                                 
13  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  Also, see Moon 1975, especially pp. 161-171.  
14  With the insult example, there are multiple possibilities.  One is that I try to insult you and then you do 
not get insulted, so “I insult you” is false.  Another is that I say something unknowingly insulting and so 
“I insult you” is true, even though my mental state was not “intend to insult”.  Another is that I say 
something that is an insult according to the linguistic and cultural institutions of our society, but I do not 
mean it as an insult nor do you take it as such (e.g. a joke).  In all these situations, understanding the 
causes of the actions requires reference to the subjective intentions of the actors.   
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that the empirical performance of the “as if” theories is lacking (this was part of the 
impetus behind the field of behavioral economics for example) the criterion of success 
involves prediction and not explanation.   
Regardless of such challenges, while it is often not made explicit, much social 
science explanation is premised on an acceptance of the Davidsonian premise that 
providing a reason for action explains the action.  Prominently, rational choice analysis 
requires that an actor made a choice for a reason and this reason explains why the choice 
was made.  For example, Frieden, outlining the strategic choice approach to IR, argues that 
specification of preferences is essential to a “full understanding of the sources of 
international political outcomes” (1999: 53).  Aside from rational choice, many approaches 
are based on the idea that reasons are a primary building block of explanation.  Elster 
(2007) only accepts explanations framed in terms of intentional choice.  Intentionalist 
interpretivism also constructs explanations in “terms of intentional explanation, i.e. in 
terms of the outcome (or aggregated outcome) of identifiable political actors acting upon 
intentional states they might plausibly hold” (Adcock 2003).  Weber placed understanding 
the motives of actors, defined as complexes of meaning that seem to the actors an adequate 
ground for the conduct in question, at the center of a scientific approach to social 
explanation (Weber 1978: 11).  Aggregating such reasons for action can provide 
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explanations for even highly complex social phenomena (Hayek 1952; Schelling 1978).   
The Fundamental Problem of Reason Attribution 
Davidson's argument brackets any methodological issues, but he does make a 
distinction between a rationalization that provides the actual reason why the action was 
performed and one that is reasonable/plausible, but does not appeal to the reason that was 
the agent's actual reason.  This distinction is crucial for any methodological discussion of 
motives.  From this distinction arises an issue that is common to all social sciences, which 
I call the Fundamental Problem of Reason Attribution: 
 
FPORA: It is impossible to directly perceive what someone else is thinking. 
 
This is also true in daily life.  Why my partner, colleagues, parents, or a stranger 
acts the way they do can only be attributed on the basis of observation of their behavior, 
including speech acts.  I think I know why I am doing something.  By using introspection, 
or self-examination of our mental states, we have a mode of access to our own mental 
states that is unavailable when we are trying to figure out the motives of other people.  I 
can introspect my reason for leaving a conversation with a colleague early, whether it be 
that I don't want to be late for a meeting or that I am uninterested in their conversation.  
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When that same colleague stops our conversation short, I am left to deal with the 
Fundamental Problem of Reason Attribution.   
There is a history in IR of a widely perceived problem stemming from the roots of 
the discipline in a debate between idealism and realism, encapsulated in the well-known 
difference between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness (March and 
Olsen 1998).  Numerous middle-range debates, such as the one about greed versus 
grievance in civil war studies, or whether the power of the UN Security Council is about 
information revelation or normative legitimacy, are fundamentally about reason attribution.  
This is the understandable doubt that a political actor ‘really believes’ what he/she is 
saying when they appeal to altruistic or moral values.  For example, Lebovic and Voeten 
(2006) claim that “the empirical implications” of an argument that states shame human 
rights violators because it provides information on a state's reputation for good and bad 
behavior and an argument that such shaming is done because non-violators morally 
disapprove of violators are “difficult to disentangle”.  This doubt elides the distinction 
between different rationalist reasons and reifies the distinction between two classes of 
reason.  The more fundamental issue is the FPORA.   
Introspection is not fool-proof.  Humans can suffer from self-deception, or 'denial' 
of their true motivations.  This can be due to the desire to conform our thoughts to socially-
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acceptable reasons so as to preserve our sense of self-worth.  Some research suggests that 
we lack the vocabulary to describe some of our thoughts, feelings, or attitudes and so we 
borrow labels and models from society to help us understand our own mental processes 
(Wittgenstein 1953; D’Andrade and Strauss 1992; Jansz 1996).  A line of psychological 
research investigating Self Perception Theory has found repeatedly that a behavior comes 
before a related emotion, despite people’s self-reports based on introspection.  If people are 
induced to smile they report being happier, if they are told to stare into a stranger’s eyes 
they report more romantic attraction to the stranger, if they are told to stand up straight 
they report higher self-esteem than if told to stand slumped, and so on (Laird 2007).  
Another serious issue is confabulation, such as when people manufacture reasons for their 
behavior, even when they did not perform the behavior in the first place (Hirstein 2005).  
The conclusion reached is that the individuals themselves make mistakes when 
introspecting the causes of their actions.  These lines of research suggest that the FPORA 
can apply even to first-person reason attribution.15   
How can we deal with the FPORA?  In this paper, I distinguish between three types 
of approach to the FPORA, assumption, avoidance, and using empirical evidence.  I lay 
out precisely the form of explanation underlying each type of approach and identify the 
                                                 
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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attractions and limitations of each.  Both the assumption and avoidance approaches have 
costs and rest upon over-stated objections to the use of evidence in reason attribution.  
Methodological Responses to the Fundamental Problem: Assumption 
One response to the FPORA is to assume or postulate a possible motive and only 
accept as valid explanations those that ultimately rely on that motive.  This we can call the 
assumption response to the FPORA.  This is a popular response in the IR and political 
science literature (not to mention economics).  An empirical phenomenon, a behavior or a 
set of behaviors, are observed and then found puzzling.  The analyst wonders how it came 
about.  They then posit a reason that makes this action or set of actions comprehensible.  
For example, Fearon aims to explain why wars are costly but nonetheless recur by 
characterizing the “full set of rationalist explanations that are both theoretically coherent 
and empirically plausible” (1995: 380).  Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) build a theory of 
domestic political institutions and foreign policy on the simple assumption that state 
leaders are motivated by a desire to survive or remain in office.  Frieden makes a further 
distinction; between assuming and “deducing” preferences, i.e. assuming preferences on 
the basis of intuitive plausibility alone, or having a “prior theory of preferences” (1999: 61) 
that links actor preferences to actor properties or environment.  For example, if we assume 
that firms are motivated by profit maximization and that their profits depend on some 
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specification of how trade policy affects a type of firm’s profits, we can “derive” that type 
of firm’s preferences over trade protection.  However, this is not epistemologically separate 
from the assumption solution to the FPORA.  Any confidence we should have in a 
knowledge claim about firm preferences over trade is a direct function of our confidence in 
the plausibility of the initially assumed preferences. 
However, the implications of the assumption response may be more uncomfortable 
than they seem and conflict with current practice.   
   
What is the form of a knowledge claim under the assumption response?   
 
A1:  I am willing, by assumption, to accept as an explanation for actions of type 
A a reason s from the set of reasons S. 
A2:  Reason s in S renders action a of type A comprehensible to me. 
A3:  Therefore, s is an explanation for a. 
 
Note that A3 does not say that s is the explanation for a.  There are two 
consequences of this type of knowledge claim. First, unless the set S has only one element, 
then even knowledge claims under the assumption response require some method of 
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distinguishing between different reasons.  It is possible that two reasons from S make the 
action comprehensible.  For example, a leader may sign a cease-fire because she wants to 
pursue peace and sees a cease-fire as a first step towards a lasting peace agreement, or she 
may want to re-attack later to improve her sides' bargaining position and sees a cease-fire 
as buying her troops some time to rest and redeploy.  One means of distinguishing between 
reasons is sheer plausibility.  It may be the case that reason s is comprehensible to you but 
you find it implausible in a particular circumstance.  If this is a crucial part of the warrant 
for your knowledge claim, this should be explicit.   
The Plausibility of Reasons for Action 
In one example of an explicit appeal to plausibility Katznelson and Weingast 
(2005), commenting on the tendency of rational choice institutionalists studying the US 
Congress to assume the motive of maximizing the probability of reelection, defend the 
assumption as justified by its general plausibility.  They reference Mayhew (1974) who 
concludes that the individualistic, open US electoral system and a minimally restrictive 
party affiliation procedure provide an incentive to focus on reelection at the expense of, 
say, party loyalty or bureaucratic wrangling, as it might be in the UK or continental 
Europe.16  However, Mayhew makes clear that this is contingent on a desire to make a 
                                                 
16 This claim also rests on the premise that if you have a contextual incentive to want to pursue something, 
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career in Washington, something that Mayhew asserts was unusual in the pre-Civil War 
era.  Even in Mayhew's study, there is no empirical evidence provided that any action by 
any individual was actually motivated by the desire for reelection except a single 
generalized out-of-context quotation.  Katznelson and Weingast's appeal to Mayhew's work 
thus does not mitigate the fact that their response to the FPORA is to assume the 
motivations of actors.   
Under the assumption response, there are no grounds for resolving a challenge 
based on the superior plausibility of an alternative reason, except in terms of plausibility.  
If any empirical evidence is used to decide between reasons, then the knowledge claim is 
subject to all of the issues inherent in such an enterprise (see below).  This is a crucial 
point.  Assessing plausibility, however, it is done, is a separate task from weighing 
evidence in a reason attribution.   
What does plausibility mean?  Is it an unjustifiable intuition?  Are there general 
properties of plausibility with regard to reason attribution, such as logical consistency or 
phenomenological familiarity?  The key feature of rational choice explanations is that 
acceptable reasons must conform to some minimal standard of rationality, such as 
completeness and transitivity of preferences.  Maybe there are some features, apart from 
                                                                                                                                                    
you are or will be motivated to act on that incentive.  For a discussion, see below. 
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any evidence about the particular case, of the current state of knowledge that mean that 
there is some sort of distance from our prior beliefs to the postulated reason.  This is a 
question for future research.   
The second consequence of the assumption response to the FPORA is that this form 
of warrant does not allow for any claims that the action is evidence supporting the truth of 
the reason s or the set of reasons S.  Instead, the assumed reason is explaining the action to 
you.  That is, the assumed reason makes the action comprehensible.   
Imagine that I see the US limiting its power by the construction of international 
organizations (IOs) that hamper its freedom of action (Ikenberry 2001).  This is puzzling 
because it seems as if freedom and flexibility are things that states should pursue.  
Ikenberry dissolves this puzzlement and explains the action by saying that the US was 
trying to transmit credible information of benign intentions to other states in the system.  If 
I am resorting to the assumption response to the FPORA, then this is as far as I can go.  It 
would be inconsistent to use statements of intention to communicate benign intentions as 
supporting evidence that that was the motivation because then I would be appealing to a 
different warrant for my knowledge claim, i.e. using evidence to adjudicate between 
possible reason attributions.  However, under the assumption response, it is consistent to 
claim that statements of other reasons are irrelevant to your knowledge claim.  That is, if 
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you are relying on the assumption response, then statements by participants that they were 
constructing IOs in order to, say, exert control in particular areas of international activity, 
or to placate a domestic constituency, do not affect your knowledge claim.  Rather than 
using evidence to decide between different possibilities, explanations based on the 
assumption response explain actions in terms of the assumed reasons.  All of the analytic 
work happens at the level of the logical consistency or the plausibility of the attributed 
reason.   
 The Costs and Benefits of the Assumption Response  
Why would you want to merely assume reasons?  A possible objection is that to 
only assume or postulate reasons is not a valuable task.  One major limitation of simply 
assuming a reason is that there is no claim that the ‘explanatory’ reason is the actual reason 
driving behavior.  It thus seems to be merely a preliminary step before the valuable part of 
research; the empirical investigation.  Clarke and Primo (2011) argue against this line of 
thinking.  They point out that elucidating a model, such as a coherent set of reasons for 
action, constitutes a valuable use of time and effort.  Rubinstein agrees, pointing out that 
the value of game theory is that it aids in the exploration of reasoning in strategic settings 
(1991).  Schelling reports a reader who had “simply not comprehended that an inherently 
non-zero-sum conflict could exist” prior to reading theoretical elaboration of such a 
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scenario in Schelling’s work (1980: vi).  Laying out or elaborating a reason or set of 
reasons and its implications clearly, explicitly, and in detail, is hard and uses different skills 
from those employed in empirical work.  Elaboration of reasons for action may also 
suggest sources of variation in action that would not have been apparent otherwise.   
Also, the evidence available for or against a particular reason may be nonexistent or 
so sparse and underdetermining that simply explaining an action may be the best we can 
do.  However, there can be serious costs to not engaging with the available evidence.  
Wendt points out that knowing how actors “were actually thinking and motivated” is 
central to choosing between equally plausible alternative explanations for international 
institutional design choices.  That is, in order to get to “the real explanation … we need to 
get inside the heads and discourse of decision makers and see what is motivating their 
behavior” (2001: 1028).  An excellent example of the drawbacks of merely assuming 
reasons is the audience costs literature.  Since Fearon's elaboration (1994) there has been a 
profusion of work utilizing the idea that a crucial way state leaders can make credible 
threats is to engage domestic political costs, "audience costs", for backing down if the 
threat is not followed through on.  This idea solved several theoretical and empirical 
puzzles, including providing a mechanism for the democratic peace finding (Schultz 2012).  
However, recent work has empirically investigated whether the audience costs mechanism 
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actually motivates crisis behavior.  Trachtenberg (2012) studies whether state leaders 
intentionally try to use audience costs to lock in a bargaining position and whether the 
adversary understands that the threatening state leader "would find it hard to give way for 
fear of incurring audience costs".  His question is: do governments "actually make this 
kind of calculation?" (2012: 7).  Despite the plausibility of the reasons involved, 
Trachtenberg finds that audience costs do not motivate behavior in the cases he studies.  
Similarly, Snyder and Borghard find "hardly any" evidence that audience costs motivate 
behavior in post-1945 crises (2011: 437).  Mercer encapsulates the primary drawback of 
the assumption solution: “Although one might use audience costs to solve a variety of 
puzzles, if audience cost mechanisms are imaginary, then so are the solutions that rely on 
them” (2012: 399). 
Avoiding Direct Reason Attribution  
Another response to the FPORA is to avoid relying on reasons as part of your 
explanatory strategy.  I call this the avoidance response.  The assumption approach is still 
fundamentally engaged in the enterprise of reason attribution.  The avoidance approach, 
however, is not.  Instead, recourse to the avoidance approach entails explicitly avoiding 
any reliance on reasons as explanatory.  This means that, as long as the explanatory goal is 
consistent with the claim, strictly speaking reasons are irrelevant to explanations taking the 
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avoidance approach.  One key benefit of the avoidance approach is that the uncertainty 
surrounding how we can know people’s reasons is no longer a problem, i.e. the FPORA 
does not apply.  However, there are costs to setting our explanatory sights lower than they 
often need be.   
Defining the avoidance approach 
The perceived need for intentional explanation is strong.  However, there are other 
types of causes that are fruitfully hunted in political science.  Many causal inferences have 
been made without relying on an answer to the question of reasons for action.  One 
example is Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) work on the duration of civil wars.  Amongst other 
claims, they argue that mountainous terrain, a proxy for the availability of hard-to-
eliminate rebel safe havens, causes an increase in the duration of civil wars.  We can use 
this to explain why some civil wars last so long, or longer than comparable others.  This 
argument is compatible with numerous reasons for pursuing rebellion or for government 
counter-insurgency actions and thus does not rely on any one particular reason.  Similarly, 
some explanations rely upon network analysis to explain patterns of behavior.  Nexon 
explains the seemingly radical shift in allegiances from the Taliban to the US in 
Afghanistan after 2001 with reference to dependency in patron-client relationships; 
because warlords were bribed to switch, most of their followers switched with them.  
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Clients may have acted out of loyalty, honor, or calculation of the benefits of not breaking 
ties with the patron.  This claim about social ties “provides significant explanatory power 
independent of specific microfoundations” (2009: 41).  The key underlying characteristic 
of the avoidance response is that the knowledge claim must be fully compatible with more 
than one (themselves incompatible) reason attributions:   
 
An explanation ε of action a avoids the attribution of reasons if there are two (or 
more) reasons such that s can be true when ε is true, and s* can be true when ε is 
true, but s and s* cannot both be true at the same time.   
 
An innovative recent line of work that relies upon the avoidance response to the 
FPORA appeals to the reasons and justifications for action that individuals express but 
avoids the attribution of a specific reason to an individual at a particular time.  Instead, the 
constellation of explicit justifications for an action is charted, with the analyst coming to a 
decision on which justifications were socially sustainable.17  Jackson argues that the 
collective shape (or topography) of the legitimation debate over a policy or set of policies 
is causally sufficient for an outcome (2006: 42).  Not only are policymakers restricted to 
                                                 
17 See also Mills (1940). 
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enacting “those policies that they can justify in a manner acceptable to their audience”, but 
the ways in which a policy is justified “makes the policy proposal possible and helps it to 
win out over alternative courses of action” (2006: 25, 29).  This position is premised on 
agnosticism as to the reasons inside individual actor's heads, and instead operationalizes 
the acceptability of policies in terms of how other actors speak and write about or act 
towards the policy.  The argument is formalized and extended in Krebs and Jackson 
(2007).  In an explicit rejection of reasons as a response to the FPORA, Krebs and Jackson 
allow that actors possess motives that shape behavior relevant to political outcomes.  But 
they propose a type of explanation to which "purposive accounts" (i.e. reason attributions) 
are irrelevant (2007:41).   
Reasons here are still explanatory, but not in the sense that actor X did action a at 
time t for reason s.  Instead of this sort of judgement, a judgement is made as to what the 
articulated justifications for action were and which of these were accepted by the relevant 
actors in the sense of not resisted.  Regardless of what the individual motivations actually 
were, or whether reasons are constituted by internal mental states, this form of the 
avoidance response allows the analyst to use evidence to determine what the actors 
involved thought a convincing justification would be.  Given that the justification was 
provided, it must have been thought convincing to some actor, even if that is the same 
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actor who is expressing the justification.  An actor makes a justification for an action or 
provides a reason why an action should be done in order to legitimate that action in the 
eyes of others.  The aggregation of those reasons at a historical point in time constitutes the 
boundaries of legitimate discourse at that time for that action.  Identifying socially 
sustainable justifications is especially useful when a group of actors are trying to come to a 
decision on a joint action, like in a government or a group of governmental actors.  
Individuals are being honest about their reasoning, or they are trying to be convincing to 
others, or they are trying to avoid censure for violating shared rhetorical standards.  In all 
three of these situations, speech acts are potential evidence of the reasons that are thought 
convincing.  
The form of the knowledge claim for a socially sustainable justification is: 
 
 SS1: A justification j for action a is given or appealed to by an actor x 
SS2: j is either not challenged/disagreed with, or it is ultimately acquiesced to by 
actors yi 
SS3: Therefore, a was allowed to occur because of j.   
 
Notice that individual reasons for action do not appear in this knowledge claim.  
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The actors could be motivated by j, they could simply be willing to accept j as a reason for 
a, or they could be motivated by j* but know that others would not be willing to accept j* 
as a reason for action.   
Here the distinction between private and public justifications is important.  Because 
public pronouncements are the only ones that are being used to legitimate action, they are 
more important than private statements as evidence to a socially sustainable justification 
explanation. 
The Costs of Avoidance 
Is anything lost by recourse to an avoidance explanation? That is, can investigating 
reasons in an avoidance explanation add anything to our understanding of the causes of 
action?  Let’s return to Fearon and Laitin’s civil war example, in which we know that 
mountainous terrain increases length of civil wars on average.  It would be a distinct 
improvement in our causal understanding to also know that the rebels retreating to 
mountain hideouts do so because they intend to regather their strength for future fighting, 
rather than that they want to surrender but they have to hide from authorities intent on 
eradicating them.  Similarly, Krebs and Jackson’s claim that conscription helped the Druze 
get awarded Israeli citizenship would be supplemented by knowing what the Israeli 
authorities’ motives were.  Did they hope that including Druze in the Israeli Defense Force 
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would bolster their claim to liberalism and undercut international criticism (2007: 50)?  Or 
something else?  Advocates of analyzing international practices have appealed to the “great 
advantage of ridding [the analyst] of the need to make problematic claims about the state 
of mind amongst the people who perform the practice” (Andersen and Neumann 2012: 
458).  As Ringmar explains, however, merely describing the practices gives us “no clue” as 
to the intentions behind the practices.  Implicitly conceding this point, some practices 
analysts deal with this problem by adding in a reconstruction of the intentions and aims 
behind practices, for example of deterrence in the Cold War (Ringmar 2014: 13).  The 
point here is not that explanation is impossible without reasons.  It is that reasons add to 
our understanding of the causes of action.   
There are at least three ways in which avoiding reason attribution lessens our 
understanding of the causes of action.  First, obviously, even though we may have a 
coherent and empirically supported explanation of an outcome, we do not know why the 
individuals involved performed the actions making up the outcome.  However, there are 
other consequences important even if we are locating explanatory leverage elsewhere.  The 
second cost of avoidance is the loss of some sources of variation in the actions of interest.  
For example, rebels regathering their strength might be less amenable to a negotiated 
settlement than rebels looking to surrender.  An Israeli government on the lookout for 
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legitimation in terms of international liberalism may do different things from a government 
looking to recruit the fiercest fighters.  Thirdly, avoidance also means losing a way to 
generate new theoretical arguments.  Empirical investigation of a particular type of action 
might unearth a hitherto unimagined reason or perhaps one that is well known but that no 
one had previously thought was driving this type of action.  For example, the actions of US 
President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger during the 1971 war between 
India and Pakistan can only be explained with reference to their secret diplomacy with the 
People’s Republic of China, ultimately motivated by grand strategy with regard to the 
USSR.  To others this motivation was unthinkable during the crisis surrounding the war 
(Hollen 1980).   
The Use of Empirical Evidence 
The third type of response to the FPORA is to adjudicate between possible reasons 
for action with reference to empirical evidence.  Despite the excessive skepticism of some 
in the political science and IR literature, humans are surprisingly successful at determining 
the mental states of others.  There are whole literatures in philosophy, psychology, and 
cognitive science dedicated to exploring the fact that we, humans, cannot observe others’ 
mental states but nevertheless routinely use them successfully to explain and predict 
behavior.  This capacity to judge others’ intentions becomes apparent in young children 
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and adults “display consummate skill” at this task, perhaps suggesting “neural structures 
innately equipped… to detect intentionality” (Baldwin and Baird 2001: 172, 176).  There is 
much debate over whether we are able to directly perceive others’ minds.  Some hold that 
we can directly perceive mentality in others, that our phenomenological experience of 
others’ mental states is immediate and not via the interpretation of the bodily movements 
of another person (e.g. Zahavi and Gallagher 2008).  Another idea is that some aspects of 
extended or distributed cognition, like the use of gestures and or pen and paper for 
informational offloading, can be seen directly (Krueger 2012: 157).  The alternative is to 
hold that humans either have some sort of folk-psychological theory about how other 
humans think (theory theory) or that we build an internal simulation of others’ minds 
(simulation theory) and use that to judge others’ mental states.  Bohl and Gangopadhyay 
point out that it is possible to doubt that we perceive shame but not to doubt that we see 
someone’s face being red, which seems to suggest that we do not directly perceive mental 
states.  However, it also seems wrong to say that, for example, seeing a tree branch 
blowing in the wind and seeing someone wave goodbye are no different in terms of 
psychological experience (Bohl and Gangopadhyay 2014: 217).  They conclude that other 
minds are not entirely hidden but that seeing them is different in some sense from seeing 
the visual properties of other objects like color or shape.   
31 
 
Interpersonally, we have many cues of body language, tone of voice, maybe our 
previous experience of the person, that we can use to supplement any analysis of speech or 
action in a reason attribution.  Schilbach et al (2013), while proposing a new way of 
approaching the neuroscience of ‘social cognition’, argue both that the more emotionally 
engaged we are with another person’s states or actions, and the more we are in interaction 
with that other person, the more likely we are to be successful at knowing what that person 
was feeling or thinking.  However, even in person we can be either unsure of reasons or 
even flat out wrong.  St Thérèse of Lisieux, a Catholic saint, kept a journal of her time in a 
convent, in which she mentions another nun who “annoyed [Thérèse] in all that she did”.  
Despite this antipathy, Thérèse was unusually nice to her colleague as part of her 
understanding of what was pleasing to God.  The colleague, despite interacting with 
Thérèse every day, was completely unaware of the motive behind Thérèse’s behavior, one 
time saying “with a beaming face: “My dear Soeur Thérèse, tell me what attraction you 
find in me, for whenever we meet, you greet me with such a sweet smile” (Lisieux 2005: 
XI, 31).  I discuss the potential problem of misrepresentation in more detail later in this 
section. 
 
The form of an empirical response to the FPORA is: 
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 E1: s is a possible reason for actions of type A 
E2: Given some evidence about what people said and/or did, I judge the most 
warranted reason for action a of type A at time t by actor X to be s. 
 
Notice that in this formulation the action is a particular action, not a type of action.  
If you hold that the reason-action connection is characterized by equifinality (where 
multiple different causes produce the same type of outcome [Mahoney 2008: 424]), then 
establishing reasons in particular cases is logically prior to establishing whether all actions 
of type A are motivated by s, or whether they are more likely to be motivated by s than 
other reasons.     
If we cannot introspect the reasons of others, what kinds of evidence can we use in 
a reason attribution?  Morgenthau famously said that “motives are the most elusive of 
psychological data” (1993[1948]: 5).  In the following sections I consider some of the 
issues involved in using three types of evidence; 1) statements, 2) actions, and 3) strategic 
context when supporting a reason attribution.  I will be appealing to ideas from the 
discussion of Inference to the Best Explanation in the philosophy of science.18  Inference to 
                                                 
18  Philosophy of science should not dogmatically drive scientific practice (Gunnell 2013) but what it can do 
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the best explanation, also called abduction, is a type of inference that privileges 
explanatory considerations, as contrasted to, for example, predictive success or logical 
deduction, in choosing between alternative theories (Lipton 1991).  For example, inference 
to the best explanation appeals to ‘theoretical virtues’ as relevant considerations in theory 
choice.  One of these is consilience,19 ‘the capacity to explain diverse independent classes 
of facts’, or the idea that a theory or hypothesis gains in credibility to the extent that the 
several pieces of evidence in its favor are unrelated, which is widely held to be a valuable 
theoretical virtue (McGrew 2003: 561).  Generally, the quality of consilience can be a 
guide to empirical practice.  How can we apply this principle to reason attribution?  First, 
there is a difference between consilience within particular classes of evidence (such as 
those I have delineated here; statements, actions, and context), and between those classes.  
So, within the class of statements, if a reason can explain, or is consistent with, a variety of 
types of statement, such as statements made within a government and also between 
governments, this reason is to be preferred to one that cannot.  Further, if a reason is 
consistent with a context (i.e. the strategic context provides an incentive for the actor and 
the reason incorporates that incentive), action (the reason explains the action or multiple 
actions) and statements (statements made by the actor or others indicate that the reason was 
                                                                                                                                                    
is shed light on what we are doing and make us wonder whether it makes sense.   
19  Thanks to David Waldner for suggesting this idea. 
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relevant to the decision to perform the action), then this reason is to be preferred to one that 
is not.  This is consilience across classes of facts.  This principle of consilience collects 
some of our intuitive reactions to evidence, subsumes much of the existing methodological 
advice on reason attribution, and is a helpful guiding principle when we are trying to 
decide between reason attributions.   
Statements of Motivation 
There is an intuitive plausibility to the following procedure.  I want to know why 
actor X did action a.  Actor X says, “I did action a because I wanted to achieve outcome b, 
or for reason s”.  Assuming that the given reason s is comprehensible to me, s explains a.  
This initially seems to be a best case scenario for empirically determining reasons for 
action.  However, there is a prominent criticism of this procedure; the potential for 
dishonesty or misrepresentation in proclaiming one's reasons.  The misrepresentation 
principle is: 
 
M: Any historical speech act of the form “I did action a for reason s”, is 
inadmissible as evidence that the reason for a was s because the historical 
performer of the speech act may have been lying.   
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There are two positions on dishonesty or misrepresentation regarding reasons.  The 
first is that political actors’ incentives for misrepresentation are so pervasive that it should 
be the default starting point of any analysis.  The other is that misrepresentation should not 
be assumed but should instead be based on evidence, for example, some inconsistency 
between various pieces of evidence.  Scholars often make a case for pervasive, systematic 
strategic misrepresentation that has prima facie considerations for reason attribution.  For 
example, Mackie notes the tendency to assume that “all men are liars” in political economy 
or public choice models of voting (1998).  Elster places this position front and center of a 
discussion of reason attribution.  He points out that “there are many reasons why people 
might want to misrepresent their motivations and those of their opponents” (2007: 59).  For 
example, societies have a normative hierarchy of motivations and people gain an 
advantage by appearing to be motivated by a 'better' motivation (this is often a significant 
part of legitimation contests).  However, one inherent problem with this argument is that it 
denies that we can know people’s real motives by appealing to people’s real motives, thus 
flirting with circularity (Bruce and Wallis 1983: 63).   
Excessive weight is often placed in IR on the possibility of misrepresentation.  This 
can have pernicious effects on research practice.  For example, excessive skepticism of 
statements leads Simmons and Danner to ignore relevant evidence of reasons and instead 
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resort to making claims based on wildly insufficient data.  They ask why the ICC was set 
up and “more importantly, why do states agree to join this institution?” (2010: 225).  
Noting that “Evidence on governments’ motive for joining the ICC is hard to come by”,  
they assert that private statements are inaccessible and public statements are too coarse-
grained, that is, they are consistent with numerous analytically distinct reasons.  That said, 
they provide a couple of statements that the ICC will reduce conflict, restore confidence in 
the country acceding, and add to the accountability of the country's leaders.  They even say 
of one statement, “One can infer from this statement that the speaker acknowledges that 
domestic processes are often less than effective, and that the ICC can in these cases 
provide a more effective—because more credible— substitute.”  (2010: 237).  However, 
they then assert, in a statement of excessive skepticism, that these statements “reveal very 
little about the way supporters expect the Court actually to operate”.  They then say that 
they will look at actions.  However, they do not.  Instead, they look at coarse-grained 
properties of states, like Freedom House democracy scores or whether a country is 
involved in a civil war, and infer directly from those properties the reasons for ratification.  
This evidence is insufficient to distinguish between alternative reason attributions, and so 
does not add to our understanding of the causes of ICC ratification.  This is one example 
where excessive skepticism of statements has led to unconvincing reason attribution.   
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Historians attempt to mitigate the problem of misrepresentation with reference to 
expressions of reason from sources they deem less likely to be used for a political purpose, 
primarily private documents including classified internal memoranda and personal letters.  
As Elster notes, the underlying principle behind the credibility of these private documents 
is that they are “less likely to be motivated by a desire for misrepresentation” (2007: 61).  
However, positing that some types of source (such as private letters and diaries [George 
and Bennett 2005: 100 fn 17]) are systematically less likely to be subject to 
misrepresentation is no more plausible than the reverse.  That is, there is no a priori 
systematic difference between types of sources in terms of whether they more or less truly 
indicate reasons.  As Broockman advocates, “both public and private statements should be 
viewed through a strategic lens” (2012:105).   
Private settings qua private settings do not systematically favor the true revelation 
of reasons.  If there is a strategic incentive to conceal or misrepresent reasons in the most 
public setting, there is also a strategic incentive to misrepresent reasons in other less public 
settings (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 40).  Jacobs (2014) argues that, in general, political 
actors “have incentives to exaggerate the importance of ‘good policy’ motives and broad 
social benefits” of their policy positions.  However, in general, political actors also have 
incentives to frame their behavior positively to any audience.  If they are speaking 
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privately to a small stakeholder group, they have an incentive to highlight the narrow 
individual benefits accruing to that group.  If they are speaking to racists they are more 
likely to appeal to racist reasons than they are to non-racists.20  It is easy to construct 
simple scenarios in which decision-makers would not lay out their actual motivations in a 
private letter to a friend or family member.  For example, maybe the actual reasoning is 
thought to be too complicated, morally questionable, or too reliant on special knowledge 
for the letter recipient to understand.  If they are writing a letter to their spouse or family 
member, they have an incentive to make themselves seem as favorable as possible to that 
person, maybe by emphasizing the private benefits that they, and hence their family, will 
accrue from an action or policy.  Even letters or memos to colleagues could fall prey to 
common distortions, such as a desire not to appear biased, idealistic, or naïve.  For 
example, if they are writing an intragovernmental memo, they have an incentive to conceal 
their idealistic motives in favor of a cynical national interest oriented analysis, so as to 
advance their standing and reputation for calm competence in that organization.   
Such speculations could be multiplied.  However, what they demonstrate is that in 
the absence of evidence, there is no good prima facie reason to accord one type of 
expression of reason primacy over another.  Instead, misrepresentation should be a 
                                                 
20  Thanks to Andrew Bennett for inspiring this point. 
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judgment arrived at on the basis of the evaluation of evidence.  There is the principle of 
nemo gratis mendax, i.e. no one lies freely.  Under this principle, expressions of reason 
should only be doubted if there is a concrete reason to do so in a particular circumstance.  
That is, the construction of a reason for dishonesty or misrepresentation must use some sort 
of evidence.  Otherwise, expressions of reason must be taken at face value.  This principle 
focuses attention on specific reasons for doubt, rather than a generalized assumption that 
anything said in public by a political actor is necessarily dishonest or disingenuous.  There 
is even some systematic empirical evidence that political leaders’ public speeches 
accurately convey their actual beliefs.  Utilizing the fact that US President John F. 
Kennedy recorded private discussions with key advisers in the summer of 1962, Renshon 
compares the operational code (a set of political beliefs) of Kennedy’s public and private 
speech, finding a “striking similarity” between the two (2009: 656).   
However, when we do have evidence of misrepresentation, then we should 
incorporate that into our reason attribution.  One notable example of evidence of 
dishonesty is that with which Nexon opens his book on the political impact of the 
Protestant Reformation.  Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, while publicly justifying his war 
against the Protestant states Hesse and Saxony as that they were “transgressors of the peace 
against the Duke of Brunswick and his territory”, wrote to his sister that this “pretext will 
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not long disguise the fact that this is a matter of religion, yet it serves for the present to 
divide the renegades” (quoted in Nexon 2009: 1).  Here the fact that we have this evidence 
makes preferring the attribution of an ulterior motive, in the face of public statements 
otherwise, warranted.   
The general principle of consilience is again a useful guide here.  The attribution of 
reason misrepresentation only makes sense when there is an inconsistency between 
different classes of evidence, like different classes of statements.  A good example of the 
utility of the consilience principle is Broockman's study of the negotiating positions behind 
the passage of a 1964 healthcare law in the US.  Broockman, addressing the “problem of 
preferences”, i.e that actors might strategically misrepresent their preferences during policy 
contestation and bargaining, advocates “considering how actors’ expressed preferences 
vary across strategic contexts” (2012: 84).  Specifically, Broockman found that a previous 
study had misattributed the preferences of business interest groups on the basis of a letter 
from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and Congressman John Byrnes, 
ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means committee.  The letter includes reasons 
why industry would support a different version of the healthcare law than was currently 
being proposed, which the previous work had said meant that the NAM and business 
interests supported passing a version of Medicare.  Broockman argues that evidence of 
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statements from different strategic contexts, including from before the Democratic 
landslide victory in the 1964 election, shows that in fact business interests “were totally 
and unmistakably opposed to Medicare” (2012: 93) and were proposing an alternative in 
order to dilute some provisions in the bill.  Further, Byrnes' writings to other Republicans 
and other statements indicate that Byrnes proposed an alternative to Medicare while 
expecting it to be rejected so that Republicans could convincingly argue that they were not 
opposed to healthcare for the aged.  Here, in accordance with the consilience principle, 
Broockman's attribution of reasons to Byrnes and industry groups is superior because it is 
consistent with different classes of evidence, i.e. statements from different strategic 
contexts.   
Consilience can also accommodate the use of different classes of evidence of the 
absence of a particular set of beliefs.  For example, when discussing the failure of German 
officials to consider the future mis-use of funds collected for the first public pension 
scheme in 1889, Jacobs makes the case that the attribution of this state of mind is 
supported by the fact that there is no mention of it across several deliberative venues 
(2014). 
As intuitively attractive as statements of the form “I did action a for reason s” are, 
much historical evidence is not as starkly related to the reason for an action. This means 
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that, in practice, using statements as evidence of reasons requires an interpretation of those 
statements.  Further, the conceptual vocabulary used by social scientists is often not the 
same as that used by historical actors in their self-ascriptions of reasons.  As Taylor notes, 
in a discussion of how our representations, e.g. justifications for action, may not map 
perfectly onto the distinct categories of action created by social scientists, “...the person 
concerned may not even possess the appropriate descriptive term.  For instance, when I 
stand respectfully and defer to you, I may not have the word “deference” in my 
vocabulary… This understanding is not, or is only imperfectly, captured in our 
representations.” (Taylor 1993: 51).  Using a statement or utterance as evidence in support 
of a reason attribution, requires making an interpretive judgment about the fit of that 
utterance into a particular theoretical framework.  This can be a serious challenge, 
especially when dealing with actors and contexts with which we may be 
phenomenologically unfamiliar (See Bevir 1999 for a thorough evaluation of this and 
related issues).  Skinner argues that one tactic for improving the quality of interpretive 
judgments is to “trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic 
context as a means of decoding the intentions of the given writer”.  Analysis of the social 
context is “the ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable 
meanings it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to 
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communicate” (2002: 87).  Hopf summarizes this position by saying that, “Evidence does 
not consist of the actor’s words alone” and that “there must always be an accompanying 
account of the relevant sociohistorical context” (2007: 61).   
Another interpretation issue is that statements sometimes cannot be accurately 
understood out of the context of the other statements made by an actor.21  A statement may 
appear to indicate a particular reason or intention or belief but when viewed amongst other 
statements made by the same person, the statement may indicate something else.  One 
example involves Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division at the 
US State Department in 1931.  Hornbeck was considering potential reactions to the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria earlier that year (“the Manchurian Crisis”). In particular, 
Hornbeck was evaluating the proposed policy of declaring that the US would not recognize 
any result of the invasion.  This policy later came to be called the Stimson Doctrine, after 
the US Secretary of State.  Hornbeck wrote a memorandum, in which he writes that the 
proposed policy of nonrecognition would, “show the powers ‘mean business’.  It would 
give the Pact of Paris ‘teeth’.  It would answer the charge that the League and the various 
governments are impotent.” (Doenecke 1981: 85).  Several secondary sources use this 
quote as evidence that Hornbeck believed that the nonrecognition policy would be 
                                                 
21  George and Bennett 2005 provide a thoughtful discussion of this particular issue, for example on pp. 99-
105.   
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effective.  However, Hornbeck places “mean business” and “teeth” in quotation marks.  
This, in addition to numerous other statements made by Hornbeck that nonrecognition 
would be relatively useless, suggests that he is responding to criticism made in the press 
and elsewhere, and that the policy of nonrecognition might deflate that criticism.   
This issue of the fallibility of interpretation places a heavy burden on the analyst, as 
establishing the context of a statement can be time-consuming and difficult, and there may 
not be much available evidence.  However, the evidentiary value of statements is 
dependent upon such interpretation.   
Actions as Evidence of Reasons 
Fear that actors misrepresent their true reasons for action is widespread.  A common 
reaction to this problem is to rely instead on action as an indicator of reasons, dismissing 
expressions as ‘cheap talk’.  Only actions that incur enough costs to discriminate between 
actors really motivated by reason s and thus willing to bear those costs in the pursuit of s 
can be used as evidence of reason.  This is the underlying logic of the resort to 'costly 
signalling' models from game theory (e.g. Fearon 1997).  Elster, asking “do they put their 
money where their mouth is?”, uses the example of the Bush administration and its 
professed reasons for invading Iraq.  The key stated reason was to seize or destroy Saddam 
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Elster argues that a useful piece of 
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evidence relevant to whether this was the true motivation would be whether the Bush 
administration took steps to protect the invasion forces from WMD (2007: 63).  Here the 
key principle is not the costliness of the action per se.  Rather, if an action would only 
make sense if performed by someone with a particular reason, then it is good evidence in 
favor of that reason being the true reason.  However, this strategy seems prey to the same 
sort of problem as afflicts the use of statements.  Any action seems liable to a redescription 
that makes more than one reason equally supported.  For example, poor planning, arguably 
in evidence in other respects during the Iraq War, could have meant that even a sincere 
Bush administration did not make adequate preparation for US troops to face WMD.   
Another way of using actions as evidence of reason involves assessing if actions, 
other than the action to be explained, by the same actor can plausibly be described as 
motivated by the same motivation.   
 
C: If there are more plausible alternative descriptions of reason s* for actions 
a* of type A or even actions b of another type B taken by actor X, then s is 
not the reason for a.   
 
In the abstract this can sound confusing and counterintuitive.  However, this format 
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for warranting a knowledge claim is widespread in lay discussions of foreign policy and is 
sometimes used by scholars.  For example, Girard (2004) asks why President Bill Clinton 
decided to invade Haiti in 1994.  Girard uses the actions of the Clinton administration as 
evidence that the pursuit of democracy and human rights in Haiti were not primary reasons 
for the 1994 invasion, despite Clinton's explicit appeal to the need to restore democracy as 
a justification for the invasion in an address to the nation in September 1994.  Girard points 
to the absence of US action to restore democracy in other countries, US willingness to 
accept the fraudulent 1994 electoral victory in the Dominican Republic in exchange for 
Dominican participation in the embargo on Haiti, and Clinton's refusal to ask for 
congressional approval of the invasion as evidence that the desire to restore democracy 
was not actually the motivation behind Operation Restore Democracy.   
Underlying the idea that actions can be used as evidence of motivation for other 
actions is the concept of reason consistency.  That is, people who are motivated to perform 
an action in pursuit of some goal are also motivated to perform other actions in pursuit of 
that goal.  I have two reactions to this consistency premise.  The first is that it is reasonable 
to suppose that an actor could be driven at two different times by two different reasons 
(this is another place where equifinality is relevant).  I might want to eat spaghetti with 
marinara sauce now because it tastes nice but later not eat spaghetti because I worry about 
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embarrassing myself in a sensitive social situation.  The latter action is not evidence 
against my eating spaghetti because I like it.  My second reaction is that it is intuitive to 
hold some consistency requirement for reason attribution.  Politicians tout their record on 
voting the same way for the same issues as evidence that they truly believe in that position. 
They are implicitly relying on the idea that someone motivated to act in a particular way 
for a particular reason is more likely to do so in the future.  This reasoning is common in 
scholarship.  For example, Saunders takes a strong position on the interpretation of 
statements made in times of crisis.   
 
“Leaders may say and do things under the pressure of crisis decisionmaking that 
may not reflect their actual beliefs. Furthermore, stated beliefs may be merely post 
hoc justifications for action. Thus one cannot infer beliefs merely by observing 
leaders in crises. I therefore shift my primary measurement of causal beliefs to the 
prepresidential period, to show that presidents arrived in office with causal beliefs 
already in place.” (Saunders 2009: 135)   
 
Here Saunders is implicitly appealing to a form of the reason consistency idea.  She 
is holding that beliefs (a central part of reasons for action) remain constant over time and 
can drive and explain behavior even in the face of contradictory contemporary statements.  
If the reason consistency idea is rejected, then we would have no reason to think that 
presidents’ beliefs before office are relevant to decisions made in office.   
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The consilience principle again proves a useful guide.  If different actions are all 
consistent with a particular reason, then that reason attribution is to be preferred to one that 
is not consistent with those actions.  However, as in the spaghetti example, changes in 
context should also be taken into account.   
Context and Reason Attribution 
Another type of evidence that might be used in a reason attribution is some property 
of the strategic context of the action performed.  A contextual condition is some feature of 
an actor’s situation, or environment, that plausibly provides him with an incentive to 
perform an action.  This kind of evidence has the benefit of often being more easily 
accessible than statements made in a situation where there is no incentive for 
misrepresentation.  Elster raises the idea of using the “objective interests” of an actor as a 
proxy for the actor's subjective motivation (2007: 61).  However, as he also notes, this can 
suggest useful hypotheses, but does not dissolve the FPORA.   
A recent example demonstrates both the importance of the strategic context in 
informing and motivating policy choices and the limitations of context as evidence of 
motive.  Harvey (2011) uses extensive evidence, including private and public speeches and 
writings, to argue that the contextual conditions facing US president George Bush after 
2001 would counterfactually have led “president” Al Gore to make the same choices for 
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the same reasons, culminating in going to war on Iraq in 2003.  Harvey does not simply 
state the context and infer the reason from that.  Instead, he carefully eliminates alternative 
motives for Bush's decisions, using a variety of types of evidence.  What confidence we 
have in Harvey’s conclusion derives from his use of different classes of evidence, leading 
to an inference to the most consilient reason.  
Merely establishing that the context could provide an actor with a reason is only the 
first step in a reason attribution.  Yet sometimes work in IR relies too heavily on strategic 
context as evidence in reason attribution.  The mere presence of a contextual condition 
cannot distinguish between reasons that are similarly supported by the presence of other 
contextual conditions.  Also, the actors in the strategic context, as described by scholars, 
may not be aware of that context.  Some work does not adequately appreciate these points.  
One example is Simmons and Danner’s analysis of the ICC (see above).  They use the fact 
that a state is involved in a civil war as their only evidence that that state's reason for 
joining the ICC was to credibly commit to abiding by a peace agreement in that civil war.  
They argue that states who have no other way to credibly commit to peace in a civil war 
join the International Criminal Court in order to increase the costs of returning to war, and 
hence more credibly committing to a peace agreement.  However, states in a civil war 
might also be involved in negotiations over trade deals (perhaps aimed at the post-war 
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period) and want to use accession to the ICC as a bargaining chip in those negotiations.   
Also, there can be more than one reason to perform the same action.  That is, two 
actions that are of the same type can be motivated by two different reasons.  One state in a 
civil war might want to credibly commit to peace using the ICC, but another might want to 
join the ICC because they think that this will enhance their chances of receiving external 
support in the civil war.  The mere fact of being in a civil war cannot distinguish between 
these two possibilities.   
Strategic context is thus useful for suggesting hypotheses of reasons, but by itself is 
only weak evidence.  However, if a reason attribution is consistent with statements of 
reason and the strategic context, then it is to be preferred to a reason that is not.  Here 
again, the principle of consilience subsumes our intuitions.   
General Comments on Using Evidence to Determine Motivation 
Some scholars take a strong stand against the position that evidence of reasons can 
be used.  For example, Jackson points out that “there is no way to tell whether these 
reconstructed motives are the real motives possessed by the historical actors in question” 
(2002: 748) and Krebs and Jackson go further to deny that there is “evidence [that] could 
even in principle clinch the case” (2007: 40).  Similarly, Frieden argues that “preferences 
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are unobservable independent of outcomes” (1999: 48).  Such a radical skepticism about 
evidence of reasons means resorting to an alternative response to the FPORA.  Jackson 
also claims that “given time, one can usually find evidence to support virtually any 
position in the documentary record” (2002: 748).  This latter position is too strong.  If you 
are accepting the possibility that you can use evidence to attribute reasons and you have a 
delimited time period and a clear group of actors you think were instrumental in the key 
decisions, the positions that receive support must be relatively limited and the weight of 
evidence may even be in only one direction, making inference to a historical reason more 
clear-cut.   
Conclusion 
Intentional explanation and hence reason attribution is pervasive in IR.  If this is to 
continue as a major part of the way we understand the social world then the FPORA is an 
obstacle to the acceptability of some of our current research practices.  This paper has 
highlighted the importance of taking a stance on the basic issue facing anyone who desires 
to attribute reason; that we cannot introspect the reasons of others.  At the very least, the 
knowledge claims you can consistently make vary with the type of response you take to the 
FPORA.  If we take this problem seriously, our response to the problem should drive 
numerous other choices in terms of the status and extent of our work, the kinds of evidence 
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we use, and how we use it.   
Several broad lessons come out of the exploration of possible responses to the 
FPORA in this paper.  First, explaining, or accounting for, known behavior using assumed 
reasons is a separate intellectual operation from using empirical evidence to establish 
reasons.  Both should be evaluated on their own terms and, given practical limitations on 
space, time, and effort, should be the subject of separate research projects.  This echoes 
Clarke and Primo’s criticism of requiring formal models to be accompanied by some form 
of data analysis (2011).  However, it is also clear that assumption responses cannot stand 
alone; in order to know the actual reasons for action, we need to engage seriously with the 
empirical challenges of reason attribution.   
Second, if your response to the FPORA is avoidance, then you are locating your 
explanatory power away from the level of the individual reason and so reason attribution 
is, strictly speaking, irrelevant.  So, while it might be interesting to speculate about 
reasons, explanations based on the avoidance response cannot be successfully challenged 
on the basis that they do not establish reasons, or eliminate alternative reasons.  That said, 
there are potential costs to avoiding reason attribution, like missing out on sources of 
variation or novel theory generation.   
Finally, there are multiple possible strategies when using empirical evidence in a 
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reason attribution.  Dividing up possible evidence into three types, statements, actions, and 
context, clarifies the particular issues involved in using each one.  Also, we can use the 
quality of consilience as a guide to choosing between reason attributions.  The more types 
of evidence explained by or consistent with a reason attribution, the greater the credibility 
of that attribution.  This is a superior guiding principle than existing exhortations to seek 
private evidence or to consider the context of documents.   
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